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Abstract 
 
  
In many legal and intelligence settings it is necessary to evaluate whether 
a stated intention is true or false. This thesis proposes that use of strategic 
interviewing may successfully elicit cues that allow interviewers to discrimi-
nate between true and false intentions. In this thesis the unanticipated ques-
tions approach ? a form of strategic interviewing ? is examined. 
Study I examines the differences between lying and truth-??????????????????
answers to questions about their intentions, and questions about the planning 
??? ?????? ??????? ???????????? ????? ???? ???????? ????????????? ????? ?????? ?????????
planned a non-criminal act; the other half (the liars) planned a mock-criminal 
act. All participants were intercepted and interviewed before they got the 
chance to perform the acts. The truth-tellers had been instructed to tell the 
truth about their intentions. The liars had been instructed to tell the cover 
story they had previously prepared. Both groups were asked two sets of ques-
tions in the interviews; (1) questions on their intentions (anticipated) and (2) 
questions on the planning of their stated intentions (unanticipated). The study 
revealed that the truth-????????? ???????? ??? ???? ?????????????? ????????? ?????
?????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
Study II examines how cues to true and false intentions are moderated 
when members of small groups are interviewed. The study focuses on within-
group consistency and content-based analysis. The experimental set-up was 
similar to that of Study I with the exception that the participants   were divid-
ed into dyads and quartets. The study showed that the truth-tellers in the 
groups answered the unanticipated questions more consistently than the liars 
in the groups. However the study revealed no difference in the consistency 
between the two groups in terms of their answers to anticipated questions. 
The quartet memb?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to questions about their stated intentions included more information than the 
?????? ????????? ???????? ??????why they needed to pursue the stated intention. 
However, the truth-tellers focused more than the liars on how to pursue the 
stated intention.  
Study III examines the combined effect of the Cognitive Interview (CI) 
and the unanticipated questions approach on the elicited cues to true and false 
intentions. The experimental set-up was similar to that of Study I with the 
exception that half the participants were interviewed using the standard inter-
view (SI) technique and half were interviewed using the CI technique. The 
study reveals that the truth-????????? ???????? ??? ???? ?????????????? ??????????
????? ???????????????????????????? ????? ???? ??????? ?????????????????????????f-
i
 fered more in the CI condition than in the SI condition, which indicates that 
the CI increased these differences. In addition, the truth-????????????????????????
????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????how they planned to 
achieve their stated intentions.  
The overall findings support the assumption that strategic questioning is a 
promising way for eliciting cues to deceit and truthfulness.  
 
Keywords: deception detection, true and false intentions, strategic inter-
viewing, unanticipated questions, groups of suspects, goal-directed behavior, 
consistency 
 
 
ii
iii
Swedish summary 
 
Både i polisiära och i underrättelsesammanhang är det viktigt att 
kunna avgöra om de intentioner en person uttrycker är sanna eller falska. 
Trots detta har nästan all tidigare forskning inom fältet lögndetektion 
handlat om hur lögnare och sanningssägare berättar om tidigare handling-
ar. Detta är anmärkningsvärt med tanke på hur viktigt det är att kunna 
avläsa huruvida en person ljuger eller talar sanning om sina framtida av-
sikter. Föreliggande avhandling undersöker i vilken grad strategiska in-
tervjuer kan resultera i ledtrådar som diskriminerar mellan sanna och 
falska intentioner. Det finns flera sätt att intervjua strategiskt. Avhand-
lingen fokuserar på (a) att under ett förhör ställa oväntade frågor, och (b) 
en teoridriven analys av svaren på förväntade frågor. De oväntade frå-
gorna förväntas resultera i ledtrådar till lögn och sanning, eftersom 
lögnare och sanningssägare förväntas ha olika svårt att besvara dessa frå-
gor. Mot bakgrund av teorin om implementation intentions finns skäl att 
förvänta sig att sanningssägares svar på förväntade frågor kommer skilja 
sig från lögnares svar. En ökad förståelse för hur människor beter sig 
(verbalt) när de ljuger respektive när de talar sanning om sina avsikter kan 
vara till hjälp för att förhindra framtida brott. 
Studie I undersökte skillnaderna mellan lögnares och sanningssägares 
svar på frågor om avsikter och fokuserade på frågor om planeringen av 
den uttryckta intentionen. Hälften av försökspersonerna planerade för att 
utföra en icke-kriminell handling (sanningssägare) och hälften planerade 
för att utföra en fingerad brottslig handling (lögnare). Sanningssägarna 
instruerades att berätta sanningen om sina avsikter medan lögnare ombads 
att dölja sina verkliga avsikter. Alla deltagare intervjuades innan de fått 
möjlighet att genomföra sina avsedda handlingar och fick två uppsätt-
ningar frågor, (1) om sina avsikter (förväntade frågor) och (2) om plane-
ringen av den utryckta intentionen (oväntade frågor). Resultaten visade att 
sanningssägares (kontra lögnares) svar på oväntade frågor var signifikant 
längre, mer detaljerade och tydligare.  
I Studie II undersöktes hur ledtrådar till sanna och falska intentioner 
påverkas då mindre grupper av misstänkta förhörs. Vi undersökte i vilken 
mån gruppmedlemmarnas utsagor var överensstämmande (inom grup-
pen). Vi analyserade också om innehållet i utsagorna skiljde sig åt mellan 
grupper som talade sanning och grupper som ljög. Studiens upplägg lik-
nade upplägget för Studie I med den ändringen att försökspersonerna 
delades in i par och kvartetter. Resultaten visade att de svar som gavs på 
oväntade frågor var mer överensstämmande för sanningssägare än för 
iv
lögnare. Lögnares och sanningssägares svar på förväntade frågor uppfat-
tades som ungefär lika överensstämmande. Kvartetternas svar uppfattades 
som mindre överensstämmande än parens svar, på både förväntade och 
oväntade frågor. Lögnares (kontra sanningssägares) svar på frågan om 
deras avsikter var mer präglade av information om varför de ville uppnå 
målet, medan sanningssägare fokuserade på att berätta hur det uttalade 
målet skulle uppnås. 
Studie III undersökte den kombinerade effekten av Kognitiv Intervju 
(KI) och oväntade frågor på magnituden av ledtrådar för att diskriminera 
mellan lögn och sanning. Deltagarna planerade antingen en fingerad 
brottslig handling eller en icke-kriminell handling, hälften av dem inter-
vjuades med en standardintervju (SI) och hälften med KI.  Alla deltagare 
fick besvara en uppsättning frågor som handlade om deras intentioner 
(förväntade frågor) och en uppsättning frågor som handlade om plane-
ringen av den handling de avsåg utföra (oväntade frågor). Frågorna om 
planeringsfasen uppfattades som oväntade av både lögnarna och san-
ningssägarna. Resultatet visade att sanningssägarnas (kontra lögnarnas) 
svar på de oväntade frågorna var signifikant mer detaljerade. Lögnarnas 
och sanningssägarnas svar på frågor om planeringsfasen skiljde sig signi-
fikant åt när de intervjuades med KI, och skiljde sig åt i klart mindre ut-
sträckning när de intervjuades med SI. Kort sagt, KI förstärkte skillnaden 
mellan lögnare och sanningssägare. Resultaten visade också att sannings-
sägares (kontra lögnares) beskrivning av sina intentioner utmärktes i 
högre grad av information som var relaterad till hur det uppsatta målet 
skulle nås. 
Det övergripande resultatet stödjer idén om att strategiska förhör kan 
resultera i ledtrådar som kan användas för att diskriminera mellan lögn 
och sanning. Avhandlingen visar att oväntade frågor kan användas för att 
förstärka skillnaden mellan sanningssägare och lögnare. Avhandlingen 
visar också att analysen av svar på oväntade frågor bör fokusera på över-
ensstämmelse, grad av detaljrikedom och tydlighet. Ett viktigt fynd är att 
samma ledtrådar skall behandlas med försiktighet när man analyserar 
svaren på förväntade frågor. Analysen av svar på förväntade frågor bör 
istället fokusera på svarens specifika innehåll, så som information om 
varför och hur intentionerna skall förverkligas. En viktig slutsats är att 
förhör som syftar till att skilja mellan sanna och falska intentioner bör 
inkludera frågor om själva intentionen, men också frågor om planeringen 
av den utryckta intentionen. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
In many legal, security, and intelligence settings it is important to assess 
???????? ?? ????????? ??????? ??????????? ???? ????? ??? ??????? ????????? ?????? ??? ??
large body of literature on deception detection, almost all the research deals 
?????????????????????????????????-??????????????????????????????????????????????
(Vrij, 2008; Granhag, & Strömwall, 2004). This is remarkable considering 
the importance of situations that call for assessing whether people are lying 
or telling the truth about their intentions. Examples of such situations occur at 
border crossings and high security facilities (Andrew, Aldrich, & Wark, 
2009). The examination of true and false intentions is not new to disciplines 
such as military studies (Donald & Herbig, 1981), negotiation research 
(Lewicki & Stark, 1996), and social cognition (Beck & Ajzen, 1991). How-
ever, this strand of research has, until recently, been ignored in the field of 
legal psychology (Granhag, 2010).  
The applied value of research on true and false intentions is vast, as it may 
prove useful for preventing crimes. For example, when there is information 
indicating that a crime is about to take place, and/or when suspects are under 
surveillance. To be able to discriminate between true and false intentions is 
not a trivial matter. The September 11th attacks in New York City in 2001 
illustrate the potential value of using interview techniques to determine 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????errorists 
who were responsible for one of the attacks were selected for extra security 
checks by a computerized prescreening system used for airport security. 
However, only their checked bags were subjected to extra screening. The 
terrorists later hijacked the aircraft and crashed it into the North Tower of the 
World Trade Center in New York City (BBC News, 2004).  
In brief, if the airport security personnel had been trained in how to strate-
gically interview passengers the event may have ended differently. Asking 
questions in a strategic way is one possible method of identifying people who 
are telling the truth about their intentions and people who are lying about 
their intentions. There are several ways to interview strategically.  
This thesis focuses on (a) asking questions which are unanticipated by the 
suspects, and (b) theory driven analysis of the answers given to anticipated 
questions. The unanticipated questions may be useful for eliciting cues to 
1
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deception as lying and truth-?????????????????????????????????????????????????
differ. Furthermore, based on the theory of implementation intentions the 
answers to the anticipated questions may be characterized by certain utterings 
to a different extent for lying and truth-telling suspects. Therefore, an in-
creased understanding of how people behave (verbally) when lying and when 
telling the truth about their intentions might be helpful in preventing future 
crimes.  
 
 
The thesis  
 
In order to examine the differences between statements that express true 
intent and statements that express false intent two major objectives are set for 
the present thesis. The first objective is to examine to what extent strategic 
questioning can elicit cues that are diagnostic to deception and truth. That is, 
the thesis examines the efficacy of the unanticipated questions approach (to 
be discussed later), as well as how factors such as group size and interview 
type moderate the efficacy of the unanticipated questions approach. Efficacy 
in this context refers to the number and strength of the elicited cues.  
The second objective of the thesis is to examine how theory driven analy-
sis of the answers given to anticipated questions (questions on intent) help to 
elicit cues to deception and truth. More specifically, it is proposed and tested 
that using the theory of implementation intentions, combined with findings 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
cues to true and false intentions.  
Study I examined to what extent strategic interviewing is successful in 
eliciting cues to true intentions and false intentions. Study II examined how 
small groups of suspects may moderate the cues elicited, with a particular 
focus on the consistency between group members. Study III examined 
whether the use of a combination of the Cognitive Interview and the unantic-
ipated questions approach further enhances the differences between deceptive 
and truthful statements. Finally, Study II and III both examined the extent to 
which the theory of goal-directed behavior, and implementation intentions, 
may elicit cues to deception and truth (Gollwitzer, 1990).  
The experimental set-up used in the three studies derives from a study by 
Granhag and Knieps (2011), with adjustments made to fit the different fea-
tures of each study. In the studies, half the participants, who planned a mock 
???????????????????? ?????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????-
???????????????????????????????????????-????????????????????????????????????????????
and interviewed before they could carry out their planned acts. In the inter-
views, truth-tellers told the truth about their stated intentions whereas liars 
2
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used their previously planned cover stories to hide their mock-criminal inten-
tions.  
The objects of analysis were the statements given during the interview and 
the ratings the participants provided in a Post Interview Questionnaire (PIQ). 
The main dependent variables were the length of the answers (Study I), clari-
ty of the statements   (Study I), the level of detail (Studies I, II, and III), with-
in-group consistency (Study II), and information on why and how to attain the 
stated goal (Studies II and III).  
 
Deception 
 
????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????c-
cessful or unsuccessful deliberate attempt, without forewarning, to create in 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????i-
nition includes two important features. First, deception is an act that involves 
at least two people (a sender and a receiver); this means that the definition 
excludes self-deception. Second, because lying is an intentional act, a liar is a 
person who intentionally attempts to create misbeliefs in another person. 
Therefore, misbeliefs created in another person unintentionally (e.g., by mis-
take) are not considered lies.  
According to DePaulo, Kashy, Kidrkendol, Wyer, and Epstein (1996), 
there are three types of lies: outright lies, exaggerations, and subtle lies. Out-
right lies are lies in which the information conveyed is completely different 
from that which the liar knows is true. An example is when a student says she 
is going to school, but instead goes to the cinema. Exaggerations are lies in 
which the facts are over- or understated. An example is when a person exag-
gerates his regret ab?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
lies involve actual truths that aim to mislead another person. This could in-
clude a lie used to conceal information by evading the question or by omit-
ting relevant details. An example is when a student says she went to school, 
but omits the fact that she left school after the first class. Outright lies are the 
most common type of lies (DePaulo et al., 1996).  
 
3
 
 
 4
Future-directed behavior 
 
Definition of intention  
 
Intention plays an essential role in future actions. In examining true and 
false intentions, it is necessary first to define the word intention. According to 
research on social cognition, an intention can be defined as an ???????????????
state preceding a corresponding action (Malle, Moses, & Baldwin, 2001). To 
clarify, intention is not the same as intentionality. Intentionality refers to the 
quality of an action (i.e., a purposeful action) or desire (Malle et al., 2001). 
Thus, intentions are directed at the ?????????????????????????????????????????
not) and tend to convey a strong commitment (which many desires lack). In 
addition, most intentions involve planning, regardless of whether they are 
criminal or non-criminal (Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2008). It should also 
be noted that an individual can have intentions that do not involve planning 
such as script-like actions (e.g., doing the laundry, walking to work, etc.).  
While this definition of intention is helpful, it is still quite imprecise. For 
example, the definition does not place any restrictions on the spatial and tem-
poral aspects of the intended act. Following the research guidelines suggested 
by Granhag (2010), this thesis deals with specific situations in which the 
actors plan single acts that are to be performed in the near future. Thus, the 
??????? ????? ?????? ????? ??????????? ??? ?????? ???? ?????? ?????? ????? ?????? ????
where are already determined.   
The words true, false, and criminal are frequently used in this thesis to de-
scribe intentions. True intentions refer to truth-???????????????????????????????n-
tions. Truth-tellers can talk openly about their true intentions because they 
are planning a non-criminal act (e.g., visiting a friend). In contrast, liars who 
are planning to commit a criminal act cannot reveal their true intentions (e.g., 
setting off a bomb). In order not to reveal a true intention, a criminally in-
clined person has to conceal that intention if asked about it.  
False intentions refer to the cover story that liars often prepare in order to 
conceal their criminal intentions. The false intention (the cover story), there-
fore, has a lawful nature. For example, if asked about the intention, a crimi-
nally inclined person (a liar) would present a cover story (e.g., visiting a 
friend or taking a vacation) instead of revealing the true intention (e.g., in-
volvement in a bomb plot). In this thesis, the terms cover story and false in-
tention are used interchangeably. 
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Planning a future act 
 
As mentioned, intentions often involve some amount of planning. As the 
focus of the thesis is the planning phase of future acts, it is essential to dis-
cuss the planning process. The ability to plan, or think ahead, which is a cen-
tral component of many aspects of complex behavior, is a basic requirement 
of many cognitive and motor tasks (Owen, 1997). Problem-solving tasks 
(e.g., Tower of London and Tower of Hanoi) are commonly used to   exam-
ine the planning process (Burgess, Simons, Coates, & Channon, 2005). Re-
search in this field has focused mainly on (a) executive control and working 
memory processes in complex problem-solving tasks (Shallice, 1982), (b) the 
relation between various kinds of planning (Burgess et al., 2005), and (c) the 
role of top-down and bottom-up processes in formulating and executing plans 
(Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth, 1979). However, future acts and their related 
planning processes have received relatively little attention from scholars 
(Burgess et al., 2005).  
Developmental psychologists refer to planning as a process in which an 
individual contemplates the consequences of implementing different alterna-
tives. This process also involves evaluating and organizing the required acts 
for achieving a desired goal (Haith, 2009). Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth 
(1979) describe two dimensions of the planning process: time and abstrac-
?????? ????? ???? ?????? ???????? ???? ???????? ??????? ??? ???? ??????? ????????? ?e-
quence (i.e., actions with different levels of abstraction can be planned at any 
???????????????????????????????????????? 
In addition, the planning process can operate on various levels of abstrac-
tion (e.g., specific vs. general). According to this conception of planning, 
?????? ?????? ????? ???????? ?? ???????? ??? ?????? ???? ???-goals (e.g., attending a 
meeting, having lunch with a friend, preparing a lecture, etc.), prioritizing 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
reevaluating the original plan, and so on. In terms of levels of abstraction, 
one ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in my office after the meeting and make sure to lock my door to avoid dis-
??????????????????????????????? that one wishes to accomplish (Hayes-Roth & 
Hayes-Roth, 1979). 
 
Goal-directed behavior 
 
In order to shed light on true and false intentions, it is important to under-
stand the processes of forming an intention to achieve the desired goal. Ac-
5
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cording to the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975), 
intention is the only factor that determines human behavior. In other words, a 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
However, according to the TRA, the formation of intentions also depends on 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
desired goal. The weakness of TRA is that it does not consider the fact that 
non-motivational factors exist in reality. Not all behavior is under an individ-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?
Blonk, 2005). Therefore, the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1985) was 
introduced as an extension of the TRA. The Theory of Planned Behavior adds 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
However, these two theories fail to explain the psychological processes 
that turn intentions into actions. Gollwitzer (1993) filled this gap by introduc-
ing the theory of implementation intentions. According to Gollwitzer, the 
theory draws on the idea that the formation of intentions plays an important 
role in relevant behavior intended to achieve a desired goal.  
Gollwitzer (1993) suggests that four phases are crucial in goal pursuit. In 
the first phase, the pre-decisional phase, people deliberate about wishes and 
select the most desirable and feasible ones. In the second phase, the post-
decisional phase, the focus is on effective planning that promotes the initia-
tion of relevant actions intended to achieve the desired goal. During this 
phase, intentions are formed although they are still pre-actional. In the third 
phase, the actional phase, people actively focus on effectively achieving the 
desired goal. In the fourth phase, the post-actional evaluative phase, actions 
aimed at achieving the goal are completed. In this phase, people evaluate 
whether the desired goal was achieved by comparing the achieved goal to the 
intended goal. The claim is that intentions enter the process in the movement 
through both pre-actional phases. During those phases, one may meet several 
obstacles that might interfere with achieving the desired goal. The formation 
of intentions at this point helps overcome these obstacles and increases the 
likelihood of achieving the desired goal.  
 
Implementation intentions 
 
As this thesis concerns the differences between true intentions and false 
intentions, it is important to discuss the characteristics of true intentions 
(Granhag, 2010). The research described in this thesis draws on the theory of 
implementation intentions (Gollwitzer, 1993). This theory illuminates the 
processes involved in true intentions and how true and false intentions may 
differ.  
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Gollwitzer (1993) distinguishes between goal intentions and implementa-
t???? ???????????? ????? ?????????? ??????????? ?? ????? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ????????n-
?????? ???????? ??????????????? ??????????? ??????????? ???? ????????? ??????? ???
???????? ?? ????? ??? ???????? ??????????? ???? ???????? ??????? ??? ????? ??? ??????????
work in time in order to be ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
Implementation intentions serve goal intentions by helping people achieve 
their desired goals.  
Goal intentions play a part in the pre-decisional phase where many wishes 
or desires compete, or even conflict, because of various restrictions (e.g., 
time or resource restrictions). This situation can change when an intention is 
????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????l-
lowed by a further commitment to achieve the initial wish or desire 
(Gollwitzer, 1993). In brief, forming goal intentions converts desires and 
wishes into more binding intentions. This explanation is consistent with Mal-
le ???????????????????????????????????????????an ?????????????????????????????????
corresponding action that is often accompanied by a strong commitment.  
Competing wishes and desires mainly dominate in the pre-decisional 
phase in which the commitment to attain the desired goal is lacking. The 
post-decisional phase is, to a greater extent, characterized by intention ac-
companied by the commitment to engage in the action that eventually can 
lead to achieving the desired goal. 
However, forming a goal intention does not guarantee achieving that goal. 
People may be uncertain of when, where, and how to implement the neces-
sary behavior. As the research suggests, applying implementation intentions 
is an effective way of solving these uncertainties and increasing the likeli-
hood of achieving the intended goal (Gollwitzer, 1993).  In essence, the ar-
gument is that implementation intentions are if-then plans that link the oppor-
tunity to act with the behavior that is effective in accomplishing the intended 
goal (Sheeran, Milne, Webb, & Gollwitzer, 2005).  
 Implementation intentions and if-then plans involve specifications in 
terms of when, where, and how for someone who intends to achieve an in-
tended goal. Research has shown that people with no intention of pursuing a 
goal are unlikely to form an implementation intention that specifies the be-
havior needed to achieve a goal (Sheeran et al., 2005). In other words, people 
who state a true intention are more likely to explain how they plan to pursue 
their goal than people who state a false intention. This observation is central 
to this thesis. 
Furthermore, liars have been shown to be generally less likely than truth-
tellers to assume others will believe them (Vrij, Fisher, Mann, & Leal, 2008). 
Therefore, if liars anticipate questions about their intentions, they are more 
likely than truth-tellers to think they need to justify why it is necessary to 
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attain their stated goal. In other words, liars may think such justifications will 
help them convince interviewers of their innocence. 
 ??????? ?????????????????????????????-interrogation strategies shows that 
when criminally inclined individuals anticipate questions about their future 
actions, they will prepare ready-made answers to such questions (Clemens, 
Granhag, & Strömwall, 2013). Therefore, one can reasonably conclude that 
truth-tellers, when asked about their intentions, will offer more information 
than liars on how they plan to achieve the stated goals. The ready-made lies 
that liars tell will focus more on why as they need to convince the interview-
er. Criminally inclined individuals, who are not expected to have implemen-
tation intentions about their false intentions, compensate by offering more 
information on why they need to achieve their stated goals. The conclusion is 
that liars strive to appear convincing.  
 
Towards interviewing strategically  
 
Researchers have suggested that strategic interviewing is a promising way 
forward in deception detection (Vrij & Granhag, 2012; Granhag, Hartwig, 
Mac Giolla, & Clemens, 2015). Understanding how truth-tellers and liars 
prepare for interviews is the central aim of strategic interviewing. This means 
the interviewer tries to understand which strategies people use and how these 
strategies moderate their cognitive processes when lying or telling truth. Stra-
tegic interviewing also focuses on how liars and truth-tellers inherent differ-
ences can be magnified during an interview in order to elicit more and 
stronger cues to deception and truth.  
 
The unanticipated questions approach 
 
The unanticipated questions approach belongs within the strategic inter-
viewing framework. As mentioned above, most intentions, whether criminal 
or non-criminal, require planning (Schacter et al., 2008). Therefore, criminal-
ly inclined people will likely have prepared answers in the event they are 
apprehended before the opportunity to commit the crimes. A consistent find-
ing is that liars prepare their responses in advance when they expect to be 
interviewed (Hartwig, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2007).  
Planned lies, which are cognitively less demanding, typically contain few-
er cues to deception than spontaneous lies (DePaulo et al., 2003). Neverthe-
less, liars only benefit from their planning if they correctly anticipate the 
questions they will be asked in interviews. Clever investigators can thus ask 
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questions that criminally inclined individuals do not anticipate. When liars 
are surprised by questions, they must invent answers on the spot. Such an-
swers may offer cues to deception.  
The unanticipated questions approach assumes that, if apprehended, crim-
inally inclined individuals anticipate questions about their intentions (e.g., the 
purpose of a trip). However, such individuals may not anticipate questions on 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
intentions. The reasoning is that if people do not intend to act on their stated 
intention??? ????? ????? ???? ???????? ???? ???? ??????? ?????? ????????????? ???????
planning focus on different elements than truth-????????? ?????????? ?? ???????
focus is on planning the criminal action and creating a convincing cover story 
if apprehended. Hence, a truth-tell??????????????????????????????????????????
??????? ????????? ????? ????????? ??????????? ????? ??????????? ????????? ??????? ???
not anticipate questions on the planning phase is also true for innocent peo-
ple. However, innocent people can use memories of the planning phase when 
they are asked unanticipated questions.  
Some unanticipated questions do not have the power to discriminate be-
tween true and false intentions. For example, an individual who claims to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Even truth-tellers may be unable to answer such a question from memory or 
may simply not know the answer. Therefore, in using the unanticipated ques-
tions approach, only questions that both truth-tellers and liars can reasonably 
be expected to answer should be asked. However, liars should find it more 
difficult to answer these questions than truth-tellers. 
 
Suspects’ counter-interrogation strategies 
 
 Research has shown that liars may attempt to control their behavior when 
they realize that someone is assessing their veracity (e.g., Burgoon, Buller, 
Floyd, & Grandpre, 1996; Burgoon, Buller, White, Afifi, & Buslig, 1999). As 
mentioned above, the unanticipated questions approach is part of the strategic 
interviewing approach to detect deception. Therefore, it is essential to under-
stand how truth-tellers and liars approach the interview situation and how 
they control their verbal behavior in order to appear truthful. The unanticipat-
ed questions approach is based on empirical findings from studies on sus-
??????????????-interrogation strategies (Hartwig et al., 2007).  
Counter-?????????????? ??????????? ???? ???????? ??? ?????????? ????????? ??? ?p-
pear convincing in investigative interviews (Clemens, 2013; Granhag et al., 
2015; Alison, Alison, Elntib, Noone, & Christiansen, 2013). These strategies 
are either self-created (see below for commentary on Anders Breivik) or pre-
9
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pared by an organized group (e.g., The Green Book or The Manchester Man-
ual) (Alison et al., 2014).  
The research on counter-interrogation strategies is quite meager (Granhag 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
self-reports (Granhag & Strömwall, 2002; Strömwall, Hartwig, & Granhag, 
2006). These studies suggest that liars prepare for interviews in ways that 
they hope will convince the interrogators to believe them. 
 ???????????????????????????????????-interrogation strategies, Clemens et al. 
(2013) found that liars often anticipate questions and prepare ready-made 
answers to those questions. Their findings show that the strategy most used 
??? ?????? ??? ???? ?????? ??????????? ??????? ????? ????????????????? ??? ?????? ????????????
The main strategy of truth-??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
with the unanticipated questions approach that shows that truth-tellers can be 
honest and rely on their memory whereas liars have to invent answers on the 
spot.  
???????? ??? ?????? ??????? ????????? ??? ???????-interrogation strategies are 
consistent with the counter-interrogation strategies prepared by the Norwe-
gian terrorist, Anders Behring Breivik, who murdered 77 persons in Oslo in 
????? ??? ?????? ?????????????? ???????????????????? ??? ????????? ??? ????? ?????
pages in which Breivik presented his far-right militant ideology) revealed that 
he had prepared ready-made answers in the expectation he would be asked 
questions on his intentions if he were apprehended before executing his 
??????? ? ??? ???????? ??? ???? ??????????? ??????? ?????????? ????? ???????-
interrogation strategy is preparation for anticipated questions. Thus, unantici-
pated questions on the planning phases pose greater challenges for guilty 
suspects.  
In their study of counter-interrogation strategies used by groups of sus-
pects, Granhag, Mac Giolla, Strömwall, and Rangmar (2013) found truth-
????????? ????? ???????- in???????????? ????????? ??? ???? ??? ????????? ????? ????????
agrees with the research on truth-tellers who plan to act alone. These re-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????-interrogation strate-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
Cognitive load approach  
 
The cognitive load approach used in deception detection is related to the 
cognitive load theory. This is a theory based on the assumption that working 
memory has limited capacity, particularly for recalling novel information 
(van Merriënboer & Sweller, 2005). The term cognitive load refers to a mul-
tidimensional construct that describes the load that performing a particular 
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???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Van Gerven, 2003; Paas & van Merriënboer, 1994).  
Cognitive load theory distinguishes between three types of cognitive load, 
however only two are relevant for this thesis: intrinsic load and extraneous 
load. (For an overview of the theory, see Paas et al., 2003). Intrinsic cognitive 
load refers to the inherent demands on the cognitive resources that affect the 
limited capacity of working memory (e.g., the act of lying imposes a cogni-
tive load). In contrast, extraneous cognitive load, which is an extra load be-
yond intrinsic cognitive load, results from external tasks or factors (e.g. 
means for making lying more difficult). The interviewer, who controls the 
level of extraneous cognitive load, can either increase or decrease the load by 
strategic interviewing (e.g., by asking unanticipated questions). 
The unanticipated questions approach relies on the assumption that lying 
often is more cognitively demanding than telling the truth (Zuckerman, De-
Paulo, & Rosenthal, 1981; Vrij et al., 2008). Therefore, when interviewers 
use an interviewing strategy based on this assumption, they may elicit more 
and stronger diagnostic cues to true and false intentions.   
  There are many reasons that may explain why liars experience relatively 
more cognitive load than truth-tellers (Vrij, 2015). First, lying requires the 
fabrication of a plausible story. Liars must also remember what they have 
said in order to maintain consistency, for example, in repeated interviews. 
Second, in interviews liars generally do not tend to take their credibility for 
granted (DePaulo et al., 2003; Kassin, 2005; Kassin & Gudjonsson, 2004). 
The reason is that the stakes for liars are often higher than for truth-tellers. 
Truth-tellers, in contrast, may fear interviewers may not learn to know the 
truth. Therefore, truth-tellers are more willing than liars to offer all the in-
formation; liars are less forthcoming because they do not want to reveal their 
criminal intentions (Hartwig et al., 2007). Third, lying is cognitively more 
demanding than telling the truth because liars are forced to monitor both their 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????r-
ceived as honest (Vrij, Granhag, Mann, & Leal, 2011c). Fourth, liars may be 
preoccupied with role-playing when taking care to hide the truth (DePaulo, et 
al., 2003; Verschuere, Spruyt, Meijer, & Otgaar, 2011). Fifth, while truth-
telling is more or less automatic and often requires little effort, lying is inten-
tional and therefore creates more cognitive load (Walczyk, et al. 2005).  
Yet, lying is not always cognitively demanding. Lying is more difficult 
than telling the truth only when the liar truly wants to be believed and thus 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???? ????????? ????????? ???????? ????? ???????? ??????? ?? ?elatively low cognitive 
load. However, extraordinary and more serious lies, which are likely to have 
greater personal consequences, create a much higher cognitive load 
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(Walczyk, Igou, Dixon, & Tcholakian, 2013; De Paulo et al. 1996; De Paulo, 
Ansfield, Kirkendol, & Boden, 2004).  
Furthermore, liars must be able to retrieve the information related to their 
intended actions with ease (i.e., planning the criminal act). Having in mind a 
clear image of the planning for their criminal intentions will make suppress-
ing the truth more difficult for them. Importantly, truth-tellers also need to 
retrieve the information related to their truthful intentions if they are to expe-
rience lower cognitive loads than liars (Vrij, 2015). For this reason, in some 
situations telling the truth can be more cognitively demanding than lying. For 
example, Walczyk et al. (2005) found that college students took a longer time 
to recall their test scores than to lie about them.  
Thus, the use of specific interventions that create cognitive loads may 
make interview situations more difficult (e.g., asking reverse order questions 
??? ??????? ?????????????? ???????????? ??????????? ?????????? ?????????? ????? ???
interviews may cause liars to use more cognitive resources as they fabricate 
convincing lies. For a recent discussion on this approach, which will be dis-
cussed more in depth below, see Blandon-Gitlin, Fenn, Masip, and Yoo 
(2014). When the interview approach increases the cognitive load, liars may 
not cope as well as truth-tellers with the additional demand (Vrij, 2015).  
There are several ways to increase the cognitive load in interviews, for 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
et al., 2011c). In the unanticipated questions approach, interviewers ask ques-
tions that are expected to increase the cognitive load for both truth-tellers and 
liars. However, truth-tellers are expected to cope better with these questions 
because as they have an actual memory of the target event. Notably, this rea-
soning is valid only for questions about the past (e.g., the planning phase). In 
summary, anticipated questions reduce cognitive load whereas unanticipated 
questions increase cognitive load.  
 
Moderating factors 
 
Many factors may moderate the answer pattern of liars and truth-tellers in 
interviews when the unanticipated questions approach is used. In this thesis, 
the focus is primarily on two of these factors: the number of suspects and the 
type of interview. In brief, interviewing individual members belonging to 
groups is common in legal and intelligence settings. Thus, it is motivated to 
examine the extent to which unique cues to truth and deception can be elicit-
ed in such contexts. The unanticipated questions approach can also be used in 
combination with other interview techniques. The thesis examines whether 
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the use of an additional interview technique (the Cognitive Interview) will 
elicit cues to true and false intentions.  
 
Multiple suspects 
 
Many crimes are planned and performed by groups rather than individu-
als, so called co-offending (Carrington, 2002; Van Mastrigt & Farrington, 
2009). Most research on deception detection focuses on individual suspects. 
However, interviews with group members may offer a unique cue to decep-
tion: within-group consistency (Vredevelt, van Koppen, & Granhag, 2014). 
Within-group consistency refers to the level of consistency between the 
statements made by different suspects who operate as a group.  
However, as a diagnostic cue, within-group consistency should be treated 
cautiously. Research on multiple suspects reveals that consistency is not al-
ways a reliable cue because liars in a group can be as consistent, or even 
more consistent, than truth-tellers (Granhag, Strömwall, & Jonsson, 2003; 
Strömwall, Granhag, & Jonsson, 2003). However, this cue pattern seems only 
tested in situations where the suspects are asked specific questions about past 
event (e.g., Granhag et al., 2003; Strömwall et al., 2003). This thesis tests the 
extent to which within-group consistency is a useful cue to separate true and 
false intentions when unanticipated questions are asked. 
 It is normal that criminally inclined group members have jointly prepared 
?? ?????? ?????? ??? ????? ????? ????? ?????? ?????? ???????? ??? ?????????? ????? ????? ???
convince their interviewers of their credibility. In brief, liars know that incon-
sistencies in their story will be noted. By contrast, it is thought that truth-
tellers assume they will be believed (Kassin, 2005; Kassin & Norwick, 2004). 
Thus, it is not expected that truth-tellers in a group will jointly prepare a story 
(Vrij et al., 2009). Truth-tellers can simply tell what they remember.  
Importantly, remembering is a reconstructive process in which omitting 
and committing some information is likely (e.g., Baddeley, 1997). People 
forget details as well as re-remember details they thought they had forgotten. 
Therefore, when two or more people talk about the same event, their stories 
often vary; each person will omit and commit different details. Logically, it is 
expected that larger groups will create more inconsistencies in telling a story 
than smaller groups.  
Inconsistencies (i.e., omission and commission errors) are not necessarily 
indications of deception. It is even possible that truth-tellers are more incon-
sistent than liars. The research on the counter-interrogation strategies used by 
small cells of suspects supports this conclusion (Granhag et al., 2013). Spe-
??????????? ?????? ??? ?????? ??????? ???? ????????? ???? ???????????? ????? ????? ?????-
?????????????????????????????????????????????rately try to maintain a high level 
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of consistency. In contrast, due to the illusion of transparency, truth-tellers do 
not have this goal. As a result, liars and truth-tellers may not be equally con-
sistent as they tell their stories. This tendency may also apply to future related 
events.   
There are at least three types of consistencies, depending on the interview 
situation. First, the within-statement consistency can be analyzed in a single 
interview with a single suspect. In this situation, a suspect may contradict 
him or herself within a single interview.  Second, between-statements con-
sistency can be analyzed when a single suspect is interviewed repeatedly. 
Third, the within-group consistency (see above) can be analyzed when groups 
of suspects are either interviewed collectively or individually. These three 
types of consistencies may sometimes be relevant at the same time, for ex-
ample, when a group of suspects is interviewed repeatedly (e.g., Mac Giolla 
& Granhag, 2014). However, this thesis only concerns within-group con-
sistency in situations when small groups of suspects are interviewed individ-
ually. 
 
Type of interview 
 
One objective of this thesis is to examine whether an additional interview 
technique may magnify the differences between deceptive and truthful state-
ments when unanticipated questions are asked in combination with the Cog-
nitive Interview (CI). The CI is a memory enhancing technique that Ron 
Fisher and Ed Geiselman (Fisher & Geiselman, 1992) developed in the mid-
1980s. The CI is organized around three main psychological components: 
social dynamics, memory and cognition, and communication (for a complete 
list of components, see Fisher, Ross, & Cahill, 2010).  
First, social dynamics (the interviewer - suspect interaction) play an im-
portant role in the success of an investigative interview. The success of the 
interview is highly dependent on how well the investigator can establish con-
tact and trust with the suspect or witness. Second, in social dynamics both the 
investigator and the suspect are involved in a cognitively demanding situa-
tion; therefore, cognitive resources should be used strategically. The CI pro-
vides different mnemonics to help to recall more details about the core event. 
Third, effective communication between the investigator and the suspect is 
essential in order to acquire as much valuable information about the event as 
possible (Fisher et al., 2010).  
However, the CI should not be seen as a fixed set of instructions. Rather, 
the CI is a toolbox of techniques. Furthermore, the selection of the CI com-
ponents depends largely on the demands of the particular interview (Fisher et 
al., 2010). For example, if there is insufficient time in the interview to use all 
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the CI components, then the interviewer can abbreviate the CI without losing 
too much information (Davis, McMahon, & Greenwood, 2005). 
 Study III uses three components of the CI: rapport building, mental rein-
statement, and report everything. Rapport building encourages the interview-
er to explore links that connect the interviewer and the interviewee on a per-
sonal level (e.g., by the use of shared experiences and emotions related to the 
core event). Mental reinstatement encourages interviewees to reconstruct the 
physical (the environment) and personal (how they felt at the time) setting at 
the time of the event. Report everything encourages interviewees to report 
everything they remember about the event, even seemingly unimportant de-
tails.  
A large body of research shows that the CI is an effective tool for inter-
viewing witnesses (Memon, Meissner, & Fraser, 2010). Respondents typical-
ly provide considerably more information when interviewed with the CI than 
with conventional police protocols (Memon et al., 2010). This thesis explores 
a new avenue by examining the extent to which the CI components further 
magnify the differences between lying suspects and truth-telling suspects 
when they are asked about the planning of their intentions. The CI is both a 
speech and a memory enhancement tool. Therefore, building rapport will 
encourage truth-tellers to tell more about their planning. Use of the mental 
reinstatement and the report everything components will help truth-tellers 
remember more details about their planning. 
 This thesis proposes that the CI will result in enhanced memory perfor-
mance by the truth-telling suspects (as they actually have been engaged in 
planning of their stated intentions, and thus have a memory about their plan-
ning and can describe it. However, the thesis proposes that the CI will not 
result in such positive effects with the lying suspects (as they have not con-
ducted any planning that they can tell about). The liars have been involved in 
planning their criminal activities and the cover story, but cannot talk about 
this without revealing the illegal intentions. In short, liars can only talk about 
their ready-made cover stories but not about how they planned them. 
 
Research on detection of true and false  
Intentions 
 
Granhag and Mac Giolla (2014) categorized the extant research on detect-
ing true and false intentions into three strands: physiological measures (e.g., 
thermal imaging and eye-tracking), implicit measures (e.g., the autobiograph-
ical Implicit Associations Test, Evaluative priming tasks, and the Sheffield 
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Lie Test), and strategic interviewing. This thesis focuses on strategic inter-
viewing.  
The arguments in favor of strategic interviewing are found in the research 
that suggests behavioral cues are rather weak and often-unreliable indicators 
of deception (e.g., DePaulo et al., 2003; Hartwig & Bond, 2011). Strategic 
interviewing, therefore, focuses on actively increasing the strength of these 
weak cues to deception and/or eliciting new cues to deception (Vrij & 
Granhag, 2012). To date, three types of strategic interviewing methods have 
been applied to the detection of true and false intentions: the Strategic Use of 
Evidence (SUE) technique (Clemens, Granhag, & Strömwall, 2011), research 
on good planning behavior (Mac Giolla, Granhag, & Ask, 2015; Mac Giolla, 
Granhag, & Liu Jönsson, 2013), and the unanticipated questions approach 
(Warmelink, Vrij, Mann, Jundi,  & Granhag, 2012).  
 
Early studies on true and false intentions 
 
In recent years, a number of studies have examined the characteristics of 
true and false intentions. Two early experimental studies compared li?????????
truth-????????? ??????????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????????????? ???????? ???? ??????? ???????
Granhag, Mann, & Leal, 2011a; Vrij, Leal, Mann, & Granhag, 2011b). In 
both studies, the researchers collected one set of statements in which the par-
ticipants lied about their intentions (false intentions), and one set of the 
statements in which the participants told the truth about their intentions (true 
intentions). These two sets of statements were compared for possible differ-
ences.  
The first study (Vrij et al., 2011a) was conducted at an international air-
port in the U.K. The study showed that passengers who lied about their inten-
tions (i.e., acts at their final destination) provided statements that were less 
plausible, although equally detailed, as statements from passengers who told 
the truth. The study also revealed that the two interviewers who elicited these 
statements could discriminate between lies and truths with about 70% accu-
racy. 
 In the second study (Vrij et al., 2011b), the same researchers asked serv-
ing military and police officers to complete an undercover mission; each of 
the participants was intercepted by either a hostile or a friendly agent during 
their mission. The officers were instructed to tell the truth about their mission 
to the friendly agents and to tell a cover story to the hostile agents. The study 
revealed that statements about false intentions and lies about past actions 
were less plausible than their truthful counterparts. There was no difference 
in terms of the details comparing true and false intentions. 
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Strategic interviewing 
 
The Strategic Use of Evidence technique  
 
The use of strategic interviewing, which is a relatively new concept in de-
ception detection research, emerged in the last decade from the Strategic Use 
of Evidence (SUE) technique (Hartwig, 2005; Vrij & Granhag, 2012; for a 
conceptual overview of the SUE technique, see Granhag and Hartwig, 2015). 
Basically, the SUE technique is based on the theoretical assumption that be-
cause liars and truth-tellers enter an interview in different mental states, they 
therefore use different counter-interrogation strategies. Furthermore, as these 
strategies guide actions, liars and truth-tellers are assumed to act differently 
with respect to critical information that might reveal their guilt (Granhag, & 
Hartwig, 2008; Hartwig, Granhag, & Luke, 2014). In short, lying suspects 
use more aversive strategies with respect to the critical information (evi-
dence), whereas truth-telling suspects use more forthcoming strategies (e.g. 
Hartwig et al., 2007; Kassin, 2005; Strömwall et al., 2006).  
The SUE technique has proven successful in eliciting cues to deception in 
various interviews with single suspects, multiple suspects, and children 
(Hartwig, Granhag, Strömwall, & Kronkvist, 2006; Granhag et al., 2013; 
Clemens, Granhag et al., 2010).  
Clemens et al. (2011) used the SUE technique to detect deception in an in-
tention context. In their experimental set-up that captured the main features 
of intentions, they introduced a number of salient comparisons that reflect the 
complexity of a particular situation. They also compared two versions of the 
SUE technique (late evidence disclosure) with a control group (early evi-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
were more inconsistent with the evidence at hand (evidence on planning) than 
the truth-???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????? ???????????????? ??? ??????? ??????????? ????? ???? ?????? ????????? ???????????
condition. Overall, these researchers found the SUE technique was successful 
in eliciting cues to deception and truth when suspects were asked about their 
intentions and about their planning related to those intentions. However, the 
use of the SUE technique is limited to situations where there is critical back-
ground information (evidence) to be used in the interview. 
 
Good planning behavior and implementation intentions 
 
In a recent study, Mac Giolla et al. (2015) established that truth-tellers use 
more task-related spontaneous thought than liars. In a previous study, Mac 
Giolla et al. (2013) examined to what extent markers of good planning behav-
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ior could be used as cues for distinguishing between true and false intentions. 
In their study, the mock-crime suspects worked in triads; half the triads 
planned a mock crime and a cover story to mask their criminal intention. The 
other half planned a non-criminal event. The findings showed the truth-telling 
suspects made statements that were significantly more indicative of effective 
time allocation and that revealed more potential problems with respect to 
attaining the stated intentions. 
Mac Giolla et al. (2013) utilized the work by Gollwitzer and colleagues 
(Gollwitzer, 1999; Sheeran et al., 2005) on implementation intentions, show-
ing that people who lack goal intention (i.e., the what) are unlikely to form 
implementation intentions (i.e., the when, where, and how). Mac Giolla et al. 
(2013) showed that truth-??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
marked by how-????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
truth-???????????????????????????????why-related utterings. Furthermore, these 
researchers claim that liars may be more motivated to explain why they in-
tend to perform a future task. Specifically, liars, who assume others will not 
find them credible, may strive to convince interviewers of the importance of 
completing their stated intention.    
 
Unanticipated questions 
 
The unanticipated questions approach can be used in situations where 
there is very limited or no relevant background information. The two princi-
pal research streams in the area of true and false intentions differ in terms of 
the object of the unanticipated questions. The first stream deals with unantic-
ipated questions that target a theme that the suspect either (a) expected or (b) 
did not expect. In this stream, questions about the expected theme (e.g., a 
planned trip) can be unanticipated if they are outside the set of anticipated 
questions (e.g., about airport transportation). Or the unanticipated questions 
may directly target an unexpected theme (e.g., the planning phase of the stat-
ed intention). The second stre????????????????????????????????????????????????
image of the stated intention. This thesis mainly contributes to the first 
stream: the unanticipated questions that target the planning of the stated in-
tentions (the unexpected theme).  
 
Unanticipated questions on expected and unexpected themes. Warmelink et 
al. (2012) examined the effect of unanticipated questions on an expected 
theme (i.e., the stated intention). To elicit cues to deception, these researchers 
compared the efficacy of a number of different unanticipated questions on the 
core event (the stated intention) and the planning of the core event. They 
asked suspects general questions about an upcoming trip (i.e., the expected 
18
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theme) as well as questions on the transportation and planning of the trip (i.e., 
the unexpected theme). They found general support for the unanticipated 
questions approach. However, only the transportation questions resulted in 
significant differences between the truth tellers and the liars. The truth-tellers 
gave comparatively more details on transportation than the liars. Warmelink 
et al. concluded that if interviewers wish to use the intuitive reasoning that 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????t-
ed questions.  
Mac Giolla and Granhag (2014) examined the benefit of unanticipated 
questions in interviews with small groups of suspects (triads). Half the triads 
planned a mock-????????? ???? ?????? ????????? ???? ?????? ????? ???????? ?? ???-
????????????????????????-??????????????????????????????????????iews, the liars told 
the cover story they had prepared to hide their criminal intentions. The truth-
tellers told the truth. The researchers found that the truth-telling triads gave 
more consistent answers to both the anticipated questions (about their inten-
tions) and the unanticipated questions (about their planning). However, the 
interaction was not significant. Therefore, the unanticipated questions ap-
proach received only partial support in terms of the consistency of the an-
swers. However, they found the truth-tellers (vs. liars) gave significantly 
longer and more detailed answers to both the anticipated and the unanticipat-
ed questions. Thus, the effects were larger for the unanticipated questions, 
therefore supporting the unanticipated questions approach.  
 
Episodic future thought. The second line of research in the unanticipated 
questions approach concerns the concept of episodic future thought. Episodic 
future thought (EFT), which refers to the ability to pre-experience future 
events through mental simulation, focuses strongly on visual imagery 
(Szpunar, 2010). Like planning, which is a typical feature of intentions, EFT 
is a typical and often-automatic feature of planning. Thus, because truth-
tellers are more likely to engage in detailed planning, their EFTs are more 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
This assumption about EFTs was examined by instructing truth-tellers to 
plan a shopping trip to a mall (Granhag & Knieps, 2011; Knieps et al., 2013a; 
Knieps, Granhag, & Vrij, 2013b). The liars were told to plan a criminal act at 
the same mall and to prepare   a cover story to mask their intention. All par-
ticipants were intercepted and interviewed before they could perform their 
acts.  
In the next step, these researchers compa???????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the basic assumption that the truth-tellers were more likely than the liars to 
have EFTs. Moreover, more truth-tellers than liars said they had pre-
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experienced a mental image in the planning stage. Thus, if suspects did not 
report experiencing a mental image in the planning phase, they were most 
likely lying about their intentions.   
Warmelink, Vrij, Mann, and Granhag (2013) conducted a related study in 
which they examined whether participants lied or told the truth about their 
planned trips. They asked specific questions aimed at learning about the sus-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-experienced a 
mental image in the planning phase, the researchers asked both general and 
specific questions. The study revealed that the truth-tellers used more spatial 
and temporal details than the liars in descriptions of their mental images.  
20
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Chapter 2 
Summary of the empirical studies 
 
The general objective of this thesis was to propose and test interview 
strategies for eliciting diagnostic cues to true and false intentions. Specifical-
ly, the objective was to examine how useful unanticipated questions (which 
target the planning phase) are in discriminating between people who lie or 
people who tell the truth about their future acts. A second objective was to 
examine to what extent drawing on the theory of implementation intentions, 
???? ???????????? ?????????????????-interrogation strategies, can be useful for 
analyzing the content of the answers to anticipated questions.  
Study I examined to what extent unanticipated questions can elicit cues 
that discriminate between true and false intentions. This study represents the 
first attempt to capture the possible differences between truthful and decep-
tive statements about future actions when using the unanticipated questions 
approach. Study II examined the assumption that unanticipated questions 
may magnify the differences between true and false intentions among indi-
viduals who are members of small groups. This study focused on groups of 
suspects because many crimes are planned and committed in groups. Study 
III examined the effects of certain elements of the CI when combined with 
the unanticipated questions approach. Although the experimental procedure 
was similar in the three studies, variations were used that were appropriate 
for the particular research questions. See Table 1 for an overview of the three 
studies. 
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Table 1. Overview of the three empirical studies 
 
Study I  
 
The main aim of the Study I was to learn to what extent interviewing stra-
tegically might be effective in eliciting diagnostic cues to true and false inten-
tions. Specifically, the objective was to examine how useful unanticipated 
questions are in discriminating between people who tell the truth about their 
intentions (true intent) and people who lie about their planned future acts by 
using a cover story (false intent). This study was the first to examine the use 
of the unanticipated questions targeting the planning of the stated intentions.  
 
Method 
 
A between-subject experimental design (Veracity: Truth-tellers vs. Liars) 
was used. The procedure consisted of three phases. 
 Phase 1. Planning: Half the participants (n = 35) were instructed to plan a 
??????????????????????? ????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????
material on a particular shelf in a store in a shopping mall. In addition, they 
were asked to prepare a cover story they could use to mask their criminal 
intentions. These participants were identified as the liars. In order to achieve 
sufficient internal validity and comparability between the events, the liars 
were given a frame for their cover story that was structurally similar to the 
non-criminal act. The other participants (n = 35) were instructed to plan a 
non-criminal act: shopping for gifts for a friend. These participants were 
Interview Dependent variables Independent 
variables 
Suspects Stated 
intention 
Retention 
intervall 
 Anticipated 
questions 
Unanticipated 
questions 
    
Study I 
 
Level of 
detail, 
clarity, 
length of 
the answer 
Level of detail, 
clarity, length 
of the answer 
Veracity 
status (truth-
teller/liar) 
Single 
suspect 
Shopping 
in the 
mall 
- 
Study II 
 
Level of 
detail, 
consistency 
+ how and 
why related 
utterings 
Level of detail, 
consistency 
Veracity 
status (truth-
teller/liar), 
Size of the 
group (dy-
ad/quartet) 
Multiple 
suspects 
Preparing 
traditional 
Swedish 
lunch 
- 
Study III 
 
Level of 
detail + how 
and why 
related 
utterings 
Level of detail Veracity 
status (truth-
teller/liar), 
Type of 
interview 
(SI/CI) 
Single 
suspects 
Protesting 
against 
fur project 
~1 week 
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identified as the truth-tellers. All participants, both liars and truth-tellers, 
were given sufficient time and information to plan their acts.  
The study imposed two specific constraints in the planning phase: (1) the 
participants had only one opportunity to perform the task, and (2) the partici-
pants had a limited amount of time to complete the task. The participants 
were informed of these constraints. At the end of the planning phase, a ma-
nipulation check was used to ensure that all participants believed that they 
were actually going to perform the assigned task.  
Phase 2. Interview: After the planning phase, all participants were inter-
cepted before they had the chance to outperform their planned tasks. The 
truth-tellers were instructed to tell the truth, and the liars were asked to tell 
the cover story they had prepared in order to hide their criminal intentions. 
All participants were interviewed individually according to a structured inter-
view protocol. One set of questions pertained to their stated intentions; the 
other set pertained to the planning phase of their stated intentions. The as-
sumption was that the planning phase questions (the unanticipated questions) 
would highlight differences between the liars and the truth-tellers, whereas 
questions on their intentions (the anticipated questions) would not.  
Phase 3. Post-Interview ratings: To map how they experienced the plan-
ning phase and the questions asked in the interview, the participants were 
asked to complete a rather extensive Post-Interview Questionnaire (PIQ). The 
first part of the questionnaire contained questions about their perception of 
the planning phase; the second part addressed how difficult/anticipated the 
participants perceived the interview questions. 
 
Results 
 
The subjective ratings showed that the participants who planned an illegal 
act lied in the interview to a significantly higher extent than the participants 
who planned a non-criminal act. Thus, all participants followed instructions. 
The results showed that the truth-tellers and the liars found the planning 
phase equally difficult, satisfying and stimulating. The liars found the time 
allocated for the planning phase significantly more sufficient than the truth-
tellers.   
Both groups found the questions on the planning phase significantly more 
unanticipated than the questions on intentions. The liars found all questions 
(on intentions and on the planning phase) significantly more unanticipated 
than the truth-tellers. Both liars and truth-tellers found the questions on the 
planning phase significantly more difficult than the questions on intentions. 
The liars and the truth-tellers found all questions (on the planning phase and 
the intentions) equally difficult. The truth-????????????????????????????????s-
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??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
The liars and the truth-tellers gave equally long answers to the main question 
on intentions.  
The truth-???????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
truth-te??????????? ???? ??????????????? ??? ????????????????????? ????????????????
perceived equally detailed. The truth-????????? ???????? ????? ??????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????s-
tion on the planning phase and when they answered the main question on   
intentions.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Study I shows that the questions on planning phase were unanticipated, 
whereas the questions on the stated intentions were anticipated. This result, 
??????????????????????????????????????????? leads to the conclusion that the 
elicited differences (between deceptive and truthful statements) are related to 
the type of questions asked. Truth-?????????????????????????????????????????s-
?????????? ???????? ??????????????????????????? ????? ???? ??????? ????ers. There-
fore, strategic interviewing is a useful technique for eliciting both subjective 
and objective cues to deception. Furthermore, the cues were stronger for an-
swers to the unanticipated questions than answers to the anticipated ques-
tions.  
 
Study II  
 
The aim of Study II was to apply the unanticipated questions approach to 
small groups of suspects, rather than single suspects. Therefore, Study II is an 
ecologically valid extension of Study I in that it examined the assumption 
that, when interviewing groups of suspects, the unanticipated questions ap-
proach can be used to elicit cues to true and false intentions. Another aim was 
to examine how useful the theory of implementation intentions and of find-
????? ??? ?????????? ???????-interrogation strategies are in the analysis of an-
swers to anticipated questions 
It was assumed that unanticipated questions would affect within-group 
consistency. Specifically, it was expected that groups of truth-tellers would 
be more consistent than liars in their answers to unanticipated questions. Fur-
thermore, it was expected that consistency would be moderated by group 
size; smaller groups of liars and truth-tellers were expected to be more con-
sistent than larger groups of liars and truth-tellers.  
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Method  
 
A 2 (Veracity: Truth-tellers vs. Liars) × 2 (Groups size: Dyads vs. Quar-
tets) between-?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
were randomly allocated to one of two veracity conditions: a true intention 
condition (a non-criminal act) (n = 116), and a false intention condition (a 
criminal act) (n = 116). Each veracity condition was further divided into ei-
ther groups of four members (quartets) or groups of two members (dyads). 
This experimental set-up was an extension of the set-up used in Study I. As in 
Study I, the procedure in Study II consisted of three phases. 
Phase 1. Planning: The non-criminal act was the purchase of lunch ingre-
dients at the shopping mall. The truth-tellers were asked to plan and prepare a 
typical Swedish lunch for two exchange students. The act required buying the 
???????????? ???? ????? ?????????? ???? ?????? ??? ???? ??????????? ?????????????
kitchen. The criminal act was to carry out a secret mission to stop harmful 
experiments on animals.  
The liars, who were asked to imagine themselves as animal lovers, were 
asked to plan the secret mission as part of a larger action that would crash the 
computer system of the organization conducting the animal experiments. The 
liars were asked to collect four items from the main shopping mall in 
Gothenburg (the mock-criminal act). They were also asked to prepare a cover 
story to mask their criminal intention.  
To increase the comparability of the two acts, the liars were given a frame 
for their cover story that was structurally similar to the act that the truth-
tellers planned. The liars were instructed to tell their cover story if appre-
hended.  
Phase 2. Interview: All participants were intercepted before they could ex-
ecute their planned acts. At this point, they were informed they would soon 
be interviewed. The liars who had planned the mock-criminal acts were in-
structed to use their cover story in order to avoid detection. The truth-tellers, 
who had planned the non-criminal acts, were instructed to tell the truth about 
their intentions. All participants were interviewed individually according to a 
structured interview protocol.  
Phase 3. Post-Interview Questionnaire (PIQ): After the interview, each 
participant was asked to rate (truthfully) their subjective perception of the 
planning phase, whether they had anticipated the interview questions, and 
how difficult they found answering these questions. The PIQ consisted of the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the planning phase; the second set focused on their experiences in the inter-
view.  
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Results 
 
To learn whether the participants followed the instructions, a number of 
different ratings from the PIQ were analyzed. Liars rated their degree of lying 
and their motivation to be believed significantly higher than the truth-tellers. 
However, the truth-tellers found it significantly easier to plan their future 
actions and were significantly more satisfied with the planning phase. Liars 
were less satisfied than the truth-tellers with the time allocated to the plan-
ning phase.  
The questions on the planning phase were significantly more unanticipat-
ed than the questions on intentions. The liars rated both types of questions as 
significantly more unanticipated than the truth-tellers. Both liars and truth-
tellers thought the questions on the planning phase were significantly more 
difficult to answer than the questions on the intentions.  
???? ??????????????? ??? ????????????????????? ?????? ??????????????????????i-
cantly less detailed than the truth-????????? ????????? ??????????? ???? ??????? ?n-
swers to the main question on the planning phase were perceived significant-
ly less detailed than the truth-?????????????????????????????????????????????m-
??????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????? 
In terms of consistency, th??????????????????????????????????????????s-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???? ??????? ???? ???? ?????-????????? ???????? ??? ????????? ????????? ??? ???????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????tion on the plan-
ning phase were significantly less consistent than the truth-??????????????????
In addition, answers by the individuals in the quartets (both liars and truth-
tellers) were significantly less consistent than the answers by the individuals 
in the dyads (both liars and truth-tellers).  
?????????????? ???? ??????? ???????? ??? ????????? ????????? ??? ??????????? ??n-
tained significantly less information related to how to achieve the stated in-
tentions (this was true for both dyads and quartets). The truth-tellers gave 
more descriptions than the liars of the separate acts related to achieving the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????n-
tions revealed significantly more motivations to perform the acts (in both 
dyads and quartets). Thus, the liars offered more reasons for why they were 
motivated to achieve their stated intentions.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The results offer fairly strong support for the assumption that unanticipat-
ed questions elicit cues that can be used for discriminating between true and 
false intentions. The study shows that the difference between truthful and 
26
CHAPTER 2 
 7 
deceptive statements is comparatively more pronounced in terms of con-
sistency and level of detail when questions are asked on the planning of a 
stated future event. Furthermore, the level of within-group inconsistency 
seems to vary depending on the size of the group. Groups of lying suspects 
and truth-telling suspects are less likely to differ in terms of consistency 
when they answer anticipated questions. Therefore, if interviewers only ask 
small groups of suspects about their intentions, there is a risk that no diagnos-
tic cues may emerge.  
 
Study III  
 
Study III examined the effects of certain components of the CI when 
combined with the unanticipated questions approach. The assumption was 
that use of these components   with the unanticipated questions approach 
would magnify the differences between truthful and deceptive statements. 
The study also examined the extent to which the theory of implementation 
intentions can be useful for detecting differences between true and false in-
tentions.  
It was predicted that the ??????? ???????? ??? ???? ?????????????? ??????????
would be less detailed than those of the truth-tellers, and that this difference 
would be further enhanced when components of the CI were used. Further-
more, it was expected that the truth-?????????????????????????????????????????????
question on the intentions would ? to a higher degree ? be characterized by 
information on how to achieve the stated goal. Furthermore, it was expected 
????????????????????????????????????? more information than the truth-?????????
answers on why the stated goals needs to be pursued. 
 
Method 
 
A 2 (Veracity: Truth-tellers vs. Liars) × 2 (Type of Interview: Standard 
Interview vs. Cognitive Interview) between-group experimental design was 
used. Each participant was randomly allocated to one of two veracity condi-
tions: a true intention condition (n = 64), in which a non-criminal act was 
planned, and a false intention condition (n = 61), in which a mock-criminal 
act was planned.  In the two conditions, the truth tellers and liars were split 
into two equal groups. In the interviews with these groups, either the Stand-
ard Interview (SI) or components of the CI were used. As in Studies I and II, 
the procedure in Study III consisted of three phases. 
Phase 1. Planning: The participants were asked to protest against a 
planned fur clothing project initiated by a company selling winter clothes. 
Half the participants (the truth-tellers), who were asked to make a legal pro-
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test against the company, chose one of the three protest letters presented to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
project manager (the non-criminal act). The other participants (the liars) were 
asked to make an illegal protest. This protest required them to install a virus 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????d-
ed for initiating the fur project (the criminal act). The liars were also asked to 
prepare a cover story that would mask their criminal intention. They were 
instructed to tell this cover story (false intention) if they were intercepted.  
The participants had 20-25 minutes to plan their acts. Thereafter, the par-
ticipants were informed that the planning phase was over. They were then 
told to return to the Department of Psychology in a week in order to carry out 
their plans. However, upon their return, all participants were intercepted and 
interviewed.  
Phase 2. Interviews: The participants were interviewed according to the SI 
or the CI. The two trained interviewers who conducted the interviews had 
received a full day of CI training led by an expert in this interview technique. 
Both interview techniques contained one set of questions on the intentions 
and one set of questions on the planning of the stated intentions. For the ques-
tions on intentions in the CI condition, only the build rapport component was 
used. For the questions on the planning phase, the build rapport, mental rein-
statement, and report everything components were used. Two independent 
evaluators rated the two open-ended questions, the main question on inten-
tions, and the main question on the planning phase in terms of level of detail 
provided and utterings related to why and how to carry out the intended acts.  
Phase 3. Post-Interview Questionnaire (PIQ): After the interview, the par-
ticipants were asked to evaluate their experience of the planning phase. In 
addition, participants were asked to rate each interview question in terms of 
to which extent they anticipated these questions and how difficult they 
thought the questions were. 
 
Results 
 
The results show that the questions on the planning phase were signifi-
cantly more unanticipated than the questions on the stated intentions. Fur-
thermore, the questions on the planning phase were significantly more diffi-
cult to answer than the questions on the stated intentions.  
The truth-????????? ???????? ??? ???? ????? ?????????? ??? ???? ????????? ??????
were significantly more det????????????????????????????????????????????? Type 
of Interview interaction was significant. The simple effects test showed that 
the truth-???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????n-
swers, both in the CI and in the SI conditions. Critically, the difference be-
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??????????????????????????????-??????????????????????????????????????????????????
For the main question on intentions, the truth-????????? ????????????? ??????i-
??????? ?????????????????????????????????????? 
For the main question on ?????????????????????????????????????????????????i-
cantly more information related to how they were to carry out the stated in-
tentions. ????????? ???? ??????????? ????? ???? ??????? ????????? ????????? ??? ????
truth-????????? ??????????????? ????????????? ???????????? on why to carry out 
the stated intentions was not supported.  
The manipulation check confirmed that the participants followed the in-
structions on whether to lie or to tell the truth. The liars rated their degree of 
lying significantly higher than truth-tellers. The liars and truth-tellers did not 
differ in terms of how motivated they were to be believed by the interviewer. 
Furthermore, the truth-tellers perceived the planning phase as easier than the 
liars. The truth-tellers were also more satisfied with their planning than the 
liars. Furthermore, the truth-tellers were more satisfied with the time allocat-
ed for the planning phase. The ratings for both liars and truth-tellers were at 
the upper end of the scale, both in terms of the satisfaction with the planning 
phase, and in terms of time allocation.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Study III lends rather strong support to the unanticipated questions ap-
proach. Specifically, it successfully demonstrates enhanced differences be-
tween deceptive and truthful statements by combining certain components of 
the CI with the unanticipated questions approach. The study supports the 
assumption that unanticipated questions are an effective way to elicit diag-
nostic cues to deception. Moreover, the study shows that the answers to antic-
ipated questions may contain cues to deception. However, as the traditional 
cues (e.g., the level of detail) to deception in the answers to the anticipated 
questions are unclear, it is necessary to learn how to analyze these answers.  
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Chapter 3 
General discussion 
 
The thesis examines attempts to elicit diagnostic cues in situations in 
which single suspects (Study I) and multiple suspects (Study II) are inter-
viewed, and when additional interviewing tactics are used (Study III). The 
main objective of the thesis is to examine the extent to which the unanticipat-
ed questions approach can be used to elicit diagnostic cues that aid in detect-
ing deceptive and truthful intentions. A second objective is to examine the 
extent to which the theory of implementation intentions, as well as the 
?????????? ??? ?????????? ???????-interrogation strategies, may be helpful in 
eliciting cues to true and false intentions. The studies establish that unantici-
pated questions can elicit cues that can be used to discriminate between true 
and false intentions. In addition, the studies establish that answers to antici-
pated questions may contain cues to deception and truthfulness if the answers 
are in a proper manner.  
 
The anticipated and the unanticipated questions  
 
The three studies support the core assumption of the thesis that the stud-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
not anticipate questions on the planning of their intentions. Without these 
findings, the support for the unanticipated questions approach would have 
been difficult to justify. It should be noted that other recent studies examining 
the unanticipated questions approach (e.g., Warmelink et al., 2012; Mac Giol-
la & Granhag, 2013) reveal a similar pattern with respect to how liars and 
truth-tellers perceive questions on their intentions (anticipated questions) and 
the planning of these intentions (unanticipated questions).  
Furthermore, and consistent with the underlying framework of externally 
increased cognitive load, the three studies reveal that the questions on the 
planning phase are significantly more difficult to answer than the questions 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????d-
ing that lying suspects found the questions on the planning phase as relatively 
more difficult and unanticipated than truth-telling suspects. The explanation 
of this finding is that liars use counter-interrogation strategies to prepare 
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ready-made answers to anticipated questions and stick to their cover story. 
Thus, answering unanticipated questions becomes comparatively more cogni-
tively demanding for liars than for truth-tellers.  
 
Cues elicited from anticipated and unanticipated questions  
 
Level of detail 
 
Anticipated questions. Some research on true and false intentions has demon-
strated that truth-tellers and liars do not differ in terms of level of detail given 
when they describe their intentions (e.g., Vrij et al., 2011a). Study I supports 
these findings. In contrast, Studies II and III show that the truth-??????????n-
swers to the main question about their intentions were more detailed than the 
??????? ????????? ????? ??????????????? ???????????? ???????????? ??????? ?????????
reported by Mac Giolla and Granhag (2014).  
The reason for truth-???????????????????????????????????????????????????x-
plained by the most common counter-interrogation strategy used by the liars 
in small groups; being restrictive with the amount of information they divulge 
(Granhag et al., 2013). Because the participants in the study worked in small 
groups, they had to stick to the story agreed upon during the planning phase 
??? ?????? ???????????? ?????????????????????????? ???? ??????? ???? ???? ??????????
answers to the anticipated questions (by liars and truth-tellers combined) did 
not differ in terms of level of detail. Thus, group size does not seem to have a 
clear effect on answers to anticipated questions.  
Furthermore, each study used a different theme for the core events. This 
difference may have affected the level of detail in answers to the anticipated 
questions. The simple explanation is that some intentions allow more space 
for details; explaining the intention to travel to a foreign country may include 
more details than planning to have dinner in a restaurant. However, it is not 
entirely clear why the truth-????????? ???wers in Study III were significantly 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????d-
ings show that for anticipated questions, the level of detail is a rather weak 
cue to deception and truthfulness.  
 
Unanticipated questions. As expected, the truth-???????????????????????????s-
tion about the planning phase in the three studies were significantly more 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
other research (Mac Giolla & Granhag, 2014) and the assumption that unan-
ticipated questions may illuminate the differences between true and false 
intentions. A simple explanation is that truth-tellers are in a better position 
than liars to answer such unanticipated questions. This finding is indirectly 
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su??????????????????????????????????-interrogation strategies of being restric-
tive with information (Granhag et al., 2013), and sticking to their cover story 
(Clemens et al., 2013). Liars, who are only prepared to tell the cover story, 
are therefore unable to give detailed answers to unanticipated questions. 
Stud???? ??? ???? ????? ?????????? ???? ??????????? ???????? ??????? ???? ?????-?????????
answers in terms of level of detail showed larger effect for the unanticipated 
questions, support this conclusion.  
When interviewers use additional interviewing tactics, such as the compo-
nents of the CI, also liars are able to provide more detailed answers. Howev-
er, in Study III, this increase in detail was marginal compared to truth-tellers. 
The truth-????????? ???????? ???????? ??????????????????? ??????? ????? ???? ???????
answers when an additional interviewing technique was used. 
 
Factors moderating the answers to anticipated and unanticipat-
ed questions 
 
Multiple suspects and consistency. One aim of Study II was to examine how 
group size moderated the consistency of answers from small groups of liars 
and truth-tellers (to anticipated and unanticipated questions). The results re-
veal that the answers from the quartets (both liars and truth-tellers) to the 
main question on intentions were significantly less consistent than the an-
swers from the dyads. However, truth-????????????????????????????????????????
question on intentions were equally consistent. These results differ from re-
cent findings by Mac Giolla and Granhag (2014) who found that cells of 
truth-tellers were more consistent in their answers to anticipated questions 
than cells of liars, but is in line with previous research on past events 
(Granhag et al., 2003; Strömwall et al., 2003).  
Study II focused on dyads and quartets whereas Mac Giolla and 
?????????? ?????? study focused on triads. Their findings should be treated 
cautiously because the difference they found between liars and truth-tellers 
only approached significance. As the quartets in Study II were less consistent 
than the dyads, it is possible that within-group consistency is affected by 
group size. The critical tipping point may occur when the group has more 
than two members. With groups of more than two members, the within-group 
consistency may decrease for answers to anticipated questions.  
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????
the answers to the unanticipated questions on the planning phase by liars in 
groups were significantly less consistent than the answers by truth-tellers in 
groups. Moreover, in line with the reconstructive nature of memory (e.g., 
Baddeley, 1997), Study II revealed that answers from the quartets were less 
???????????????????????????????????? 
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In sum, these findings demonstrate that consistency can be a diagnostic 
cue to true and false intentions when unanticipated questions are asked. In 
contrast, consistency should be treated cautiously with respect to anticipated 
questions because liars and truth-tellers seem equally consistent when an-
swering such questions.  
 
Multiple suspects and the level of detail. Study II established that group size 
moderated the level of detail in the answers to unanticipated question. The 
members in quartets gave less detailed answers than the members in dyads. 
This was true for both truth-tellers and liars. Two reasons considered both 
separately and jointly, may explain this finding. First, the liars may not have 
prepared and agreed upon answers to the unanticipated questions. Therefore, 
they needed to be very restrictive in their answers in order not to contradict 
other group members. Second, the experimental set-up may have been a fac-
tor. Some members in the larger groups may have been less involved in the 
planning phase than members in the smaller groups.  
These explanations may also be valid in real life settings. Yet it may be 
difficult in larger groups to involve each member equally and to create a cov-
er story that all members agree to and can remember. Given that larger 
groups are less consistent than smaller groups, it may be difficult for liars to 
prepare a cover story that is (a) detailed enough to be convincing and (b) not 
??????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? 
Furthermore, research on decision-making may shed more light on this is-
sue. According to the theory of bounded rationality, developed by Herbert 
Simon (Simon, 1978) there are, broadly speaking, two contrasting decision-
making strategies: satisficing and optimising. These strategies may be seen as 
opposite ends of the same scale. For example, a satisficer evaluates various 
alternatives until satisfied with one alternative that exceeds an acceptability 
threshold. In other words, in satisficing, one chooses the good enough alter-
native rather than search for the optimal alternative. In optimizing, one 
searches for and selects the alternative with the highest expected utility 
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Schwartz et al., 2002). An argument can be 
made that liars satisfice to a higher extent than truth-tellers because liars have 
to plan two things: the criminal act and the cover story. Thus, truth-tellers 
may have more possibilities to strive for optimal solution in terms of how to 
achieve their intentions. 
For at least two reasons, liars may decide to allocate more resources to the 
criminal act than to the cover story. First, liars have limited planning time. 
Second, liars must compromise when they invent and tell their cover story 
(e.g., to be consistent, liars may restrict the amount of detail in their cover 
story). Because committing the criminal act is the main goal of criminally 
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inclined people, it is reasonable to conclude they may satisfice in terms of the 
cover story. This is also in line with what has been stated in some texts writ-
????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????? 
 
The Cognitive Interview and the level of detail. The CI has been used suc-
cessfully to elicit detailed and accurate recall by truthful interviewees (Fisher, 
2010). Furthermore, previous research has revealed, with some exceptions 
(Bembibre & Higueras, 2011, 2012), that the CI is helpful in discriminating 
between truthful and deceptive accounts (Colwell et al., 2002; Hernandez-
Fernaud & Alonso-Quecuty, 1997; Vrij, 2014). Study III confirms these find-
ings in that components of the CI seem to moderate the level of detail given 
in interviews.  
Specifically, suspects who were asked unanticipated questions and were 
interviewed using components of the CI gave more detailed answers than 
others who did not receive any memory enhancing techniques. Furthermore, 
truth-telling suspects gave more detailed answers than lying suspects when 
asked unanticipated questions, both with and without the use of the CI com-
ponents. However, when components of the CI were used, the level of detail 
given magnified the difference between th?? ??????? ???? ???? ?????-????????? ?n-
swers. This finding suggests that the use of additional strategic components 
with the unanticipated questions approach may be an effective way to reveal 
the differences between truthful and deceptive statements. 
 
Additional cues: clarity and length of the answers 
 
Clarity. Study I differed from Studies II and III in terms of the cues exam-
ined. In addition to the level of detail, Study I examined the clarity and the 
length of answers. The study found that truth-?????????????ers to unanticipat-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to invent answers to unanticipated questions on the spot, they seem to have a 
difficult time coming up with clear and detailed answers. This finding, which 
was expected, lends further support to the value of the unanticipated ques-
tions approach.  
It may be surprising that the truth-??????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
prepare for the questions on intentions. Therefore the finding that their an-
swers to anticipated questions were less clear than the truth-?????????????????
was unexpected. The level of detail in the statements may explain this find-
ing. In truthful statements, clarity may increase as the level of detail increas-
es. In deceptive statements, this relationship may be less straightforward; 
while liars may produce answers as detailed as the truth-????????????????????????
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may be unable to answer anticipated questions as clearly as truth-tellers. Li-
ars may continue to offer a rather general level of detail (e.g., by interpreting 
???????????????? ?????????? ?????-tellers, however, may offer more specific 
statements that include much more precise detail (e.g. by describing the pur-
chase of special gift coffee mugs).   
 
Length of the answers. Study I shows that the truth-?????????????????????????n-
swers to the anticipated questions were generally about the same length. Yet 
the truth-tellers used significantly more words when answering the main un-
anticipated questions on the planning phase. This finding supports the as-
sumption that liars prepare for anticipated questions but not for unanticipated 
questions. These results replicate previous findings by Vrij et al. (2011a) and 
Mac Giolla and Granhag (2014).  
 
The planning phase 
 
The unanticipated questions focused on the planning phase. Therefore, in 
order to map the differences between truth-telling suspects and lying sus-
pects, it is necessary to examine how the participants perceived this phase. 
Study I shows that the truth-tellers and the liars found the planning phase 
equally difficult. In comparison, Studies II and III show that the liars found 
the planning phase significantly more difficult than the truth-tellers. In Study 
II, because the participants worked in groups, the liars may have found the 
planning and the recall of their cover story a more complex task because each 
group member had to memorize (a) their own task, (b) the other group mem-
?????? ?????? ??? ????????? ????? ?????????????p member was specified in the in-
structions), and (c) the agreed-on cover story.  
Furthermore, in Study III the liars may have perceived the planning phase 
as comparatively more difficult because of the nature of the task: the virus 
installation in Study III may have been more challenging compared to the 
illegal act in the store in Study I and the computer crash mission in Study II. 
In addition, because one week elapsed between the actual planning and the 
?????????? ??? ?????? ????? ???? ?????????? ??????????? ??? ?he planning phase may 
have been affected. 
Study I reveals no difference between the truth-tellers and the liars in 
terms of satisfaction with the planning phase. In contrast, in Studies II and 
III, the liars were significantly less satisfied with the planning phase. This 
dissatisfaction is consistent with the explanation that planning the tasks was 
relatively more complex for the liars than for the truth-tellers. The research 
on decision-making lends support to this observation. Tversky and Shafir 
(1992), for example, claim that conflict in decision-making can influence 
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satisfaction with decisions. Because each alternative has its advantages and 
disadvantages, people often feel conflicted when they make a selection. They 
may even be somewhat dissatisfied with their final selection.  
Thus, liars have to decide how much of their resources to allocate (a) to 
the criminal act and (b) to the cover story. In line with this there might be two 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????s ar-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
prioritize the planning of these acts. This means they may have satisficed in 
terms of the cover story to a larger extent compared to the criminal act. Sec-
ond, given that all study participants were intercepted and asked both antici-
pated and unanticipated questions, this procedure may have influenced the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the planning phase. If the liars had not been intercepted and questioned, they 
might have been more satisfied with their cover story as they would never 
have had to put it to a test. Therefore, it is unsurprising that the liars were 
generally less satisfied with their planning than the truth-tellers. 
Finally, Study I shows that the truth-tellers thought the time allocated for 
planning was significantly less sufficient than the liars. In Studies II and III, 
the truth-tellers thought the time allocated was significantly more sufficient 
than the liars. However, the absolute values, for all studies, indicated that 
both liars and truth-tellers were quite satisfied with the time allocated.  
 
The content-based cues to true and false intentions: Utilizing 
theory from social cognition 
 
Studies II and III are the first studies in the field of deception detection in 
using theory of implementation intentions. Consistent with the theory of im-
plementation intentions (Gollwitzer, 1990), the findings from these two stud-
ies show that the truth-????????? ???????? ??? the main question on their inten-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
how they would perform their stated intentions. Both Studies II and III 
reached this conclusion, which supports other recent research (Mac Giolla et 
al., 2013; Mac Giolla, Granhag, Sooniste, & Liu Jönsson, 2015).  
However, the liars offered comparatively more information than the truth-
tellers on why they had to perform their stated intentions (Study II). This 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-interrogation 
strategies, suggests that liars prepare ready-made answers to anticipated ques-
tions (Clemens et al., 2013). This finding is also consistent with results by 
Mac Giolla et al. (2013) and Mac Giolla et al. (2015).  
However, Study III reveals a different pattern. The truth-????????????? ????
????????????????????????? ??? ???? ???????????? ???????????? ???????? ???why they 
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intended to perform their stated intention. The explanation may be due to the 
difference in the experimental set-up. In Study III, the participants were 
asked to choose one of three protest letters to submit. They were also asked to 
write a short explanation of why they chose this particular letter.  
Furthermore, because the participants in Study III expected a face-to-face 
meeting (with the fur project leader), their planning may have involved rea-
soning related to why they thought it was necessary to stop the activity they 
were to protest against. Therefore, truth-tellers may have been primed to fo-
cus on explanations on why they chose this protest letter and why it is neces-
sary to achieve their stated intention (i.e., to stop the fur project). An addi-
tional reason for why the how related utterings reveal a more consistent pat-
tern is that this is a theory-driven finding, whereas the why related utterings 
have a less clear theoretical connection. 
Moreover, the findings on how and why related utterings can also be un-
derstood within the context of construal level theory (Rim, Uleman, & Trope, 
2009; Stephan, Liberman, & Trope, 2010; Trope & Liberman, 2010; Wakslak 
& Trope, 2009). As intentions refer to acts that may happen in the future they 
can be represented as mental construals.  It can be argued that false intentions 
have a low likelihood of occurring as the stated acts are not intended to be 
carried out, and should therefore be represented by high-level construals. 
True intentions, as defined in the current work, are followed by high degree 
of commitment and have therefore a high likelihood of actually taking place. 
Thus, true intentions may be represented by low-level construals. An action 
construed in concrete terms (e.g., a true intention) is linked with how the 
action is to be performed.  
Because the planning phase may contain concrete procedural steps needed 
to achieve a goal, and it is assumed that the truth-??????????????????????????????
steps (e.g., to visit a friend in London I need to save money for the tickets). In 
contrast, an action construed in more abstract terms (e.g., a false intention) is 
linked more to why ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
tend to reflect the superordinate purpose of the action (e.g., I will visit a 
friend in London because friends are important). 
??? ????? ??????? ??? ??????? ??? ????????????? ????? ???? ??????? and the truth-
????????? ??????? contained information on both how and why. Thus, infor-
mation about one or the other of these aspects is not a clear indication of de-
ception or truthfulness. 
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Limitations 
 
The three studies for this thesis were conducted in a controlled laboratory 
environment. This research setting may limit the generalizability of the find-
ings. First, the results can only be generalized to situations that involve a 
specific event in the near future and to situations where the event is well de-
fined by time and space. This requires revisiting the definition of intention.   
Because Gran?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????the-
sis, a rather strict working definition of an intention is used. This definition is 
applicable only to situations for which the what, how, when and where are 
planned. Thus, this research is relevant for situations in which suspects have 
decided on what act they plan, how they will perform this act, as well as 
where and when they will perform this act.  
Second, the assumption that planning precedes intentions can be chal-
lenged. Many script-like routine acts may not require any planning. Shopping 
in the mall, which can be considered a scripted event, requires very little 
elaborate planning. However, when planning is more complicated, truth-
tellers can provide more information about their planning. Liars may benefit 
from the complexity of their cover story only if they are asked anticipated 
questions but not when asked unanticipated questions. For example, when 
asked unanticipated questions about the planning phase, liars will gain little 
or nothing. Because they did not expect these questions, they are, of course, 
unprepared to provide the level of detail the complexity of the cover story 
seems to require. Unanticipated questions may therefore be more (not less) 
effective when the stated intention requires more complex planning.  
Third, the majority of the participants in the three studies were university 
students. This raises the question of to what extent the results can be general-
ized to real-life settings. This research assumes liars will use counter-
interrogation strategies and will prepare ready-made answers for anticipated 
questions. These assumptions may be more pronounced and valid in real-life 
settings, as real criminals can be assumed to be more motivated to be per-
ceived as truthful than mock-suspects.  
Fourth, the measures used to increase the internal validity in the three 
studies may be problematic. To achieve sufficient internal validity and com-
parability among the events, the liars were provided with a frame for their 
cover story. This frame was structurally similar to the non-criminal act. This 
procedure may limit the ecological validity of the findings because the natu-
ral variation in the event type was reduced. However, the focus of the analy-
???? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the findings may not necessarily be limited to similar events. As mentioned 
above, the findings can only be generalized to situations in the near future 
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and for which the what, when, and where are planned. Therefore, future re-
search should examine whether the findings of this research are valid for 
events at various levels of abstraction.  
The fifth limitation is more general in nature and concerns the cognitive 
load approach to deception detection. A number of recent studies using dif-
ferent methods (e.g., reverse order answering, fixed eye gaze, time pressure 
answering to closed-ended questions, etc.) to induce cognitive load have pro-
duced promising results (Vrij & Granhag, 2012; Vrij et al., 2011c; Walczyik 
et al., 2005). However, some researchers have raised concerns about the un-
derlying cognitive mechanisms used when increasing cognitive load (Blan-
don-Gitlin et al., 2014; Walczyk et al., 2013). 
 Specifically, these scholars argue that there is a lack of knowledge on the 
cognitive processes activated when using interviewing strategies that increase 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ???????????????? ???? ?????? ?????????? ????? ??? ?????????? ?????????? ??? ????
little. This may, in turn, lead to lower deception detection accuracy.  
These researchers emphasize the importance of examining the cognitive 
mechanisms used in the operation of the cognitive load approach. This exam-
ination is necessary for providing a sounder empirical basis and a more ro-
bust theoretical foundation for the approach, and for avoiding possible errors 
in assessing veracity (Blandon-Gitlin et al., 2014). Therefore, for future re-
search, it is essential to investigate these underlying mechanisms further; 
however, this investigation is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
Future directions  
 
Research on true and false intentions has progressed rapidly in recent 
years and there   are now many ways to approach this topic. The unanticipat-
??? ?????????? ????????? ??? ?????? ??? ?????????? ??????? ???????-interrogation 
strategies and the assumption that lying is often more cognitively demanding 
than telling the truth (Zuckerman et al., 1981; Vrij, 2008). However, it is 
possible that, as researche??? ??????? ??????????? ??????????? counter-
interrogation strategies, liars may develop and apply new counter-strategies 
better adapted to answering unanticipated questions. For example, if liars 
become familiar with the unanticipated questions approach, they may expect 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????g-
nitive load, leading to situations in which the possibility of identifying cues to 
deception is reduced.  
Furthermore, research shows that it is possible to reduce cognitive load by 
manipulating counter-strategies (Blandon-Gitlin et al., 2014).  For example, 
introducing a design where half the liars are familiar with the basics of the 
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unanticipated questions approach could result in a better understanding of the 
?????????? ??????????????? ??? ???? ?????????? ????? ????????? ??? ??????? ?????????
counter-interrogation strategies may help to identify the limits of the unantic-
ipated questions approach.  
This thesis does not aim to examine situations in which the criminally in-
clined person engages in extensive planning of a cover story. However, situa-
tions in which criminals create new cover identities and live the roles of their 
cover stories are not uncommon. This observation agrees with the instruc-
tions in terrorist handbooks such as the Manchester Manual.  
Liars sometimes create cover stories, which are mainly intended and only 
make small changes in order to mislead the interviewers (Leins, Fisher, & 
Ross, 2013). Such cover stories, in which the lies are nested in the truth, are 
called embedded or subtle lies (Mac Giolla, Granhag, & Vrij, 2015; DePaulo 
et al., 1996). Future research may profit from a deeper examination of such 
cover stories.  
Following the suggestion by Mac Giolla, et al. (2015), there may be bene-
fit in acknowledging the research on goals. Liars and truth-tellers may share 
more specific lower-order goals (e.g., going to work every day), but differ in 
their higher-order goals (e.g., long-term career plans). Therefore, questions 
on the more abstract, higher-order goals, which are less likely to be incorpo-
????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????earch.   
Last, future studies may profit from examining cues to true and false in-
tentions in more ecologically valid settings. It is not uncommon to have in-
tentions but not yet having defined the when, where, or how to attain them. In 
order to further explore cues to false intentions, it is important to examine 
????????????????-?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
defined with respect to time and space. The use of such empirical settings 
would facilitate deeper examination of the relevance of the theory of imple-
mentation intentions (Gollwitzer, 1990). This research would allow us to 
learn more about whether and how liars and truth-tellers differ in terms of the 
information they provide about when and where the intended act will take 
place. This research would thus allow us to learn more about the formation of 
true intentions as well as suggest possibilities for eliciting of new diagnostic 
cues. In summary, the more we know about true intentions, the more effec-
tively we can distinguish between true and false intentions.  
 
 
Ethical considerations 
 
The subject and themes of the research for this thesis may raise some ethi-
cal concerns. A first general concern relates to intentions when an act is 
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planned but is not yet performed. The concern is whether research on true 
and false intentions may lead to arresting and even prosecuting people on the 
basis of having unlawful intentions but without having committed any crime. 
This is a difficult issue. Planning may involve concrete steps and decisions 
that, when identified, could be used as evidence. In fact, some countries have 
laws, which allow convicting people on the basis that their planning that 
would have resulted in a crime.  
However, the unanticipated questions approach used in this research is de-
signed for use in situations where no evidence exists. Moreover, this ap-
proach only aims to detect whether the stated intention is true or false, and 
not to reveal what the person actually will do (e.g. criminal act). If this ap-
proach is used, and cues to deception are found, the conclusion is not neces-
sarily that individuals have criminal intentions. The conclusion may well be 
that the individuals are lying about their intentions for some other reason than 
hiding a criminal intention. Furthermore, the approach is relevant for police 
investigations but also for many other situations that require identifying 
whether the information provided is true or false (e.g., screening processes at 
airports or when gathering human intelligence).  
A second concern is related to the use of psychological knowledge for im-
posing possible negative consequences on a person. According to the Ameri-
can Psyc?????????? ?????????????? ???????? ??????????? ???????? ????? ???? ??? ???
abuse of the basic ethical practice of psychologists. However, in the research 
for this thesis, an intervention was used that was intended to produce a posi-
tive effect on truth-????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 Specifically, the aim of the research was to use strategic interviewing in a 
way that truth-???????? ?????????? ?????????????????? ????????????????? ??????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? not intended to 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????p-
proach used is in accordance with the guidelines of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act (PACE; Home Office, 1985) in England and Wales, and with 
ethical considerations related to police investigations in the Nordic Countries 
(Stridbeck & Granhag, 2010).  
A third ethical concern relates to the experimental design used in the three 
studies. Half the participants were asked to plan and commit an unlawful 
task. To overcome this ethical problem, we informed the participants that the 
studies were based on role-play and that all parties involved are informed 
about the planned acts. In addition, we several constraints were used to en-
courage participants to remain committed to their intentions (e.g., limited 
time and opportunity to perform the acts, moral reasons to commit the acts, 
and additional compensation for successfully completing the acts). All partic-
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ipants were told they could leave the experiment at any time, and would still 
receive full compensation. 
The fourth ethical concern relates to the funding source for the research of 
this thesis. The High Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG), which is a 
small section in the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), funded Stud-
ies II and III. A question arises whether accepting financial support from a 
foreign criminal investigative organization is consistent with research ethics.  
There are several responses that may resolve this question. First, the fund-
ing source did not dictate the theme of the research. The principal investiga-
tor (Professor Pär Anders Granhag) proposed the research. The research 
questions examined in Studies II and III are similar to those examined in 
previous research conducted by the grant holder and the thesis author. Sec-
ond, the funding was awarded to the principal investigator in open competi-
tion in the same way that other major research agencies (e.g., the Swedish 
Research Council) fund research. Third, a research committee evaluated and 
approved the research proposal. Fourth, prior to the research, a guarantee was 
made that all data in the studies were intended for publication in peer-
reviewed, scientific journals.  
 
Conclusions and practical implications 
 
This thesis provides empirical support for the premise that strategic inter-
viewing is a promising way for eliciting cues to deception (Vrij et al., 2011c). 
Furthermore, the thesis proposes and examines the efficacy of a theory from 
the field of social cognition used to discriminate between true and false inten-
tions, which is rather rare in research on deception detection (Vrij & 
Granhag, 2012).  
The overall results reveal that asking suspects about the planning phase of 
their stated intentions elicits more and stronger cues to true and false inten-
tions than simply asking about their stated intentions. Furthermore, the thesis 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????? are useful in examining answers to unanticipated questions. This 
thesis suggests, however, that these cues should be treated with caution in the 
analysis of answers to anticipated questions. The findings indicate that, in 
analyzing answers to anticipated questions, one should concentrate on the 
specific content of the answers, such as information related to why and how 
to perform the stated intentions.  
In terms of the practical implications, the thesis suggests that, in order to 
elicit diagnostic cues to deception and truth, it is important to ask both antici-
pated and unanticipated questions. In brief, such interview protocols are like-
ly to be more successful for discriminating between truth-tellers and liars 
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than interview protocols with only anticipated questions. Sooniste, Granhag, 
and Strömwall (2015) addressed this conclusion in their development and 
testing of a training package based on the empirical findings from the use of 
the unanticipated questions approach.  
In this test, trained and untrained investigators were compared in terms of 
the interview tactics used, detection accuracy, and cues for assessing veracity. 
Both the subjective measures (self-reported tactics) and the objective 
measures (interview analyses) revealed that the trained investigators followed 
the training received. A significantly larger proportion of trained investiga-
tors than untrained investigators asked unanticipated questions. It is of note 
that none of the untrained investigators said they had asked unanticipated 
questions for strategic purposes.  
The combined evidence from this test revealed that the investigators who 
followed the training perceived it as novel and useful. In addition, the trained 
investigators achieved a higher detection accuracy level than the untrained 
investigators though this difference was not significant. Although the use of 
different tactics and cues did not result in superior accuracy by trained inves-
tigators, the findings offer a viable basis for future attempts to build an inter-
view protocol using the unanticipated questions approach. 
Although research on true and false intentions has increased rapidly in re-
cent years, the area is still new. It is believed that the present thesis offers a 
step forward. It is important to remember that detecting deception and truth 
has never been (and will never be) an easy task. The same may be said for 
true and false intentions. This thesis offers no simple recipe for detecting true 
and false intentions, but it does suggest a consistent pattern exists in truth-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
is used. In this respect, this thesis contributes to the evolving research in the 
area of eliciting diagnostic cues to true and false intentions. 
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